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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D. , Montana)

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY

Mr. President:
Two weeks ago the President of the United States addressed the
Congress on the state ofthe Union,
the occasion of his inauguration,

Last week he spoke to the entire nation on

These statements both dealt in significant

measure with the problems of war and peace.

There was concern over the one.

There was eloquent hope in the bright promise of the other.
It was to be expected that the President would turn his attention to these

rr.atters.

The problems which confront us in our relationships with other nations

are the most fundamental of our times,
importance of domestic is sues,

To say that is not to minimize the

Adequate education for our children, decent living

standards for all Americans, conservation of natural resources, power development, farm income --all these and others --are of the greatest consequence to
the people of the United States,

They are issues which will occupy most of the

time of the Senate during the current session,
debate not in an atmosphere of secure peace.

But they are is sues which we shall
We shall debate these issues in the

ever -lengthening shadow of nuclear warfare, that unfolding science of certain
human extinction,
The fact is that foreign policy, once remote, now intrudes into every
aspect of our national life,

It has come to exercise the most intimate influence

over the welfare and the future of every man, woman and child in the United States,
It has become the life and death factor of civilization in this second half of the 20th

Century,

- 2 -

I hope that Congress, no less than the President, will give adequate
attention to foreign policy during the current session.

The Legislative Branch is

not without Constitutional responsibilities and powers in this connection .

It is to

the Senate that the President must turn for advice and consent in fundamental
foreign questions.

It is Co'!"lgress which appropriates the vast public funds to

support our defense e stablishm.entr:,
foreign aid programs .

It is Cor..gre s s which approves or disapproves

It is Congress which provides for the Department of State

and the numerous other agencies of government involved in activities abroad,

It

is Congress which, if circumstances were so to require, would declare war and,
if circumstances were ever again to permit, make peace,
In stressing the importance of the Senate, of the Congress

1

in foreign

-;:elations, I have no desire to detract frorr. the significance of the President in
these matters,

If our responsibilities are great, his are greater,

The President alone speaks for the entire nation in our relations with
others ,

He alone leads us --Re publicans and Democrats alike --in foreign

policy .

The President may lead well or he may lead badly.

Regardless of party,

however, no American can escape the consequences of his leadership.
Nor can the President abdicate his responsibilities of leadership m
foreign relations.

The Vice President will not serve for the purpose .

of the Cabinet, not even the Secretary of State, can substitute.

No member

Nor can the

National Security Council, or any manner or number of special Presidential cornmissions , comrnittees and counselors.
State, may be helpful,

All these, and especially the Secretary of

In the end , however

1

it is the President who either gives
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or fails to give effective direction to the course which the nation pursues abroad.
In this age of synthetics, the way has not yet been found to synthesize the
Presidency of the United States.
The point I wish to make is that, under the guidance of the President,
the functions of fo reign policy are shared functions, shared between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government.

They can be effectively dis-

charged only when there is leadership in the Presidency and when there is a
mutual will to cooperate between the Executive Branch and Congress.
I know of no Senator on this side of the aisle who does not believe the
country would be better off under a Democratic President,

By the same token,

howe ver, I know of no Democratic Senator who will not sustain the President
when he speaks or acts in our relations with others on behalf of the United States.
Let me say then at the outset that so long as President Eisenhower leads wisely
a7ld without partisanship, he shall have the cooperation he needs from the
Democratic majority in Congress.
Some may call this attitude bi-partisan or non-partisan.
myself, I have no particular attachrnent to these terms.

As for

They have for too long

been used by the Executive Branch to beat the drums for precipitate action in
foreign relations,

For too long they have served as a club to silence responsible

criticism in Congress,

These terms, in short, have been twisted and distorted

by misuse.
I shall never be party to a bi-partisan silence when conscience requires
rr.e to speak out on foreign policy,

I hope the Senate shall never subscribe to a

glib bi-partisanship as a substitute for independent thought by this body,
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Whatever the word we n>ay use, however, the course which the
Democratic majority will pur sue in questions of foreign relations during this
session is clear.

It is the course of responsible cooperation.

What applies to

the Democratic majority ought to apply no less forcibly to the Republican
minority .

And with all due respect, it must also apply to the Republican

President and the Republican Secretary of State.
The need for responsible cooperation places upon us all an extra
measure of restraint in dealing with matters of foreign policy.

It requires us

all of us-- to lift above party the international interests of the United States.

It

constrains us --all of us --to great care in the consideration of questions which
involve these international interests,
Let rr"e say again, however, that the restraints of cooperation apply
with equal force to the Republican minority and the Republican President.

The

Democratic majority in the Senate --this majority of 2 votes --cannot carry
the burden alone,
all sides .

If there is going to be cooperation, it will have to come from

If it is not forthcoming, the people of this country are capable of

asses sing responsibility for the failure ,
We have already had one example in this session of how not to
promote responsible cooperation.
on the Middle East ,

I refer to the President's proposed resolution

I shall speak frankly in the hope that we may be able to

avoid in the future a repetition of this ineptitude.
The Middle Eastern proposal was a matter presumably of the highest
national in"portance.

The President believed the coope ration of Congress was
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essential in handling it and has sought that cooperation.

Yet his proposal was

allowed to trickle out of the Executive Branch days before Congress received any
official notification of it,

I, myself, learned all of its details from the news-

papers long before the Secretary of State gave us the same details in a secret
session of the Foreign Relations Committee,
The resolution raises issues of tremendous constitutional significance,
Yet we have still to determine what Congressional leaders were consulted in its
formulation.

We have still to determine whether they were consulted by the

Executive Branch before or after parts of the press of the nation were taken into
its confidence.
This resolution was presented on the basis of urgency, but what
suddenly gave rise to the urgency has never been explained by the Executive
Branch,

Months before they erupted in the clash at Suez, the accumulating

dangers in the Middle East had been noted by members of Congress in both
parties and citizens outside the government.

Many proposals for prompt and

constructive action were made to the Administration.

Throughout a long

election campaign, however, the Administration permitted these dangers in the
Middle East to fester in the warm prornises of peace and the non-involvement of
the United States.

Now, the Administration has suddenly discovered that there

is no peace, that there must be deep involvement and that Congress must
authorize the involvement,
We are told that we face the most dangerous situation in ten years;
that it is more dangerous than the Berlin blockade, than the collapse of China,
than the Soviet direct threat against Western Europe, than the Hungarian crisis,
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This great danger -- and let me say that I believe it is a great danger --this
great danger is discovered by the Administration only a short time after the
election results are in and a few days before the new Congress is scheduled to
convene,
It is so great a danger that the President sees fit to intrude the

matter into the orderly and established procedures of the government,

It is

presented to the Congress with the fanfare of crisis before the State of the Union
message and before the new Congress has even had an opportunity to complete
its organization,
I do not know who advised the President on this procedure.
that he was ill-advised.

I do know

The handling of this matter by the Executive Branch

this matter of the highest national importance --this greatest danger in ten
years --has had all the earmarks of a blatant press agentry.
Responsible cooperation in foreign policy requires that this body
give careful consideration to a:1y proposal ad ranced by the President of the
United States.

It does not require us to pan._pe.r the public relations experts of

the Administration,

I arn glad to note c:1at despite the clumsiness of its intro-

duction, the Senate is proceeding in this Middle Eastern question as it should in
all matters which affect the lives and future of the people of the United States.
So far as the Democratic rr.ajority is concerned, we shall give the
fullest regard to the views of the President, as he has presented them to the
Congress,

We shall pay the most careful attention to the evaluations of the

Secretary of State and the President's other assistants, as they have been expressed at appropriate hearings.
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We shall weigh these views in the light of the interests of the people
of the United States, as we see those interests.

We shall weigh therr; in the light

of independent evaluatiotis of the N1iddle Eastern situation as they are advanced
in the press and elsewhere.

We shall weigh them in the light of the personal

knowledge and experience of merr.bers of this body.
We shall proceed, in short, as the Senate ought always to proceed in
vital matters of foreign policy.

We shall proceed in independence but with full

deference for the leadership of the President.

I am confident that members on

the other side of the aisle will approach the question of the Middle East or any
question of this kind in the same fashion,
What is the alternative?

Can we do less?

Can we blithely consign

to the President, not merely to President Eisenhower but to any Presidents who
may come after him, powers which under the Constitution repose in the
Congress?

Can we establish in careless haste precedents which may strip the

office of the Presidency of power to direct the armed forces as may be nece ssary in the interests of the United States?

Can we share responsibility with the

President, as he asks us to do in this Middle Eastern matter, without grasping
the full implications of what it is that we are asked to share?

Without a con-

vict.i on that it is a responsibility that we can, in good conscience, share?
The resolution on the Middle East is an interpretation of a critical
international situation by the Executive Branch of the government,

It is also a

remedy advanced by that Branch as to how the situation ought to be met.

The

Senate knows frorr1 past experience that the Executive Branch is no more infallible than the Congress,
developments,
them.

That Branch can be wrong in its grasp of international

It can be wrong in the measures it proposes for dealing with
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Under a government of separate powers, the orderly processes of
the Senate and the Congress as a whole can act to correct possible distortions
both in the interpretations and the remedies to which they give rise.

In the

past, Congress has repeatedly exercised this function of correction.

V e nlUst

continue to exercise it or face frankly the prospect of fundamental changes in
our Constitutional system,

And we rnust, if we are to exercise it well, not be

driven by the whip of urgency after months of inaction by the Executive Branch,
a Branch which presumably was in full possession of the facts.
I appreciate the efforts that the President has made to guide the
course of American policy in these dangerous tirr.es,
he has so impressed much of the rest of the world.
best, whether or not they are always fruitful.

He is a man of peace and
His intentions are of the

The Secretary of State, too, has

worked tirelessly and selflessly to safeguard the interests of the United States
as he sees those interests.

With all due respect to both the President and the

Secretary of State, however, it seems to me that the need for a constructive
contribution to foreign policy from the Senate at this time is very great.
There is a need for the Senate to bring the whole international
situation --not merely the Middle East-- into perspective and to keep it in
perspective,

To the extent that the Executive Branch should fail to see the

realities abroad which confront the nation, then the Senate rr.ust try to illuminate
these realities.

To the extent that we believe foreign !JOlicy as advanced by the

Executive Branch is inadequate, ineffectual or ill-adapted to the needs of the
nation, then it is incumbent upon us to state our beliefs.

It is incumbent on us
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to dissent.

And it is incumbent on us to advise constructive alternatives when

we do dissent,
These powers of the Senate in foreign relations are far-reaching
powers.

They can work great good for the nation or they can work great harm,

They should always be exercised with restraint and care.

When necessary,

however, they must be exercised.
Mr. President, throughout the last session of Congress, I made an
effort to keep the international problen1s which confront the nation and our
foreign policies under independent review in the Senate.
Senate did the same.

Other members of the

I recall that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas

(Mr. Fulbright) and the able and conscientious minority leader (Mr, Know land)
turned to this subject many times.

So, too, did the Senator from Vermont

(Mr. Flanders), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Smathers), the Senator from
Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey), the Senator from Washington (Mr. Jacks on), the
Senator from Missouri (Mr, Symington), and many others,
During the second session of the 84th Congress, I delivered a series
of speeches in the Senate on the international situation and foreign policy,

In

these remarks, I sought to spell out what I hold to be essential in the relationship between the President and the Congress in carrying on the foreign policy of
the nation.
There is, I believe, little that is partisan in these speeches.
event, their intention was not partisan,

In any

They question neither the patriotism

nor the motives of the President of the United States and his chief advisors on
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foreign policy.

They give credit to the Administration where credit was due.

They accept the

prerr~ise

of leadership by the President m foreign relations and

urge only that he exercise it more clearly and firn. ly.
There is support for some aspects of the Administration's policies
in these speeches,

I tried not to oppose merely for the sake of opposition.

Where I found it necessary to dissent, I sought to offer constructive alternatives.
It is gratifying to note that over the months since I began this series last

January some of these alter·,_at:ves have been incorporated into the understanding and actions of the Executi··e Drench,
these changes,

I clain1 no special credit for any of

The impetus for them came from many sources, including other

members of this body and the Congress as a whole.

I merely point to the fact

in order to emphasize that the Senate can rr.ake a contribution to the course of
Arr.erican policy by the process of independent review.
I do not know, Mr. President, how often I shall be able to turn to the
subject of foreign relations in discussions on the floor during the current
session .

Before we were much advanced into the legislative schedule for the

year, however, I did want to set forth n1y under standing of what the nation's
interests required, beyond party, in the way of responsible cooperation between
the President and the Congress in foreign relations.
I also want to set forth at this time my understanding of the current
situation abroad and what I believe to be the principal inadequacies of the
Administration• s policies in meeting that situation,
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Mr. President, we are confronted not merely with one difficult
situation in the world, that of the Middle East.
and all must be faced.

We are confronted with many

Some of these situations are critical, as is the case in

the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

Others, dormant for the n 1oment, rr"ay

become equally critical or more so in the near future.
of the situation in Western Europe and the Far East.

That is true, I believe,
Still others, like that in

Latin America, are what I would regard as neglected situations.

Finally,

there are those areas of the world which represent, in my opinion, improved
situations,

I would include in this category Southeast Asia and parts of North

Africa,
As I have already noted, I have been deeply disturbed by the manner

in which the Administration has handled Middle Eastern developments.

There

were steps recommended months ago which had they been taken might well have
prevented the outbreak of the Suez conflict,
late,

They were not taken or taken too

Each delay has acted to increase the dangers in that region and the

potential cost of meeting the dangers.

In this resolution which the President

has sent to us, we now have the cumulative price of inaction, of empty campaign
slogans of peace where there was no peace,
It is a heavy price,

It may now involve the commitment of American

military strength of unforeseen dimensions to the Middle East.

It may now

involve the beginning of military and economic assistance activities in new and
perhaps questionable channels in that region,

The Administration does not even

guess at the ultimate scope or cost of these activities.
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I have never opposed econorr.ic or rr.ilitary assistance to other n a i o n s
if, in rr.y judgn ent, it held realistic promise of prorr.oting responsible and
stable governrr.ent, peace and international corr..merce, with consequent b enefit
to this nation.

It is still not clear, however, that the changes in the foreign aid

legislation as sought in the President's resolution will serve that purpose.
Further, the resolution ignores the immediate difficulties which have upset
peace in the Middle East --the Suez situation and the Arab-Israeli dispute.

It

may even act to intensify these difficulties.
Speaking for myself, Mr. President, I desire to make clear that I
believe action by this government -- cooperative and constructive action by the
President and the Congress -- in the Middle Eastern crisis is essential.

I want

to rr.ake equally clear, however, that I do not believe that the proposal presented
by the Executive Branch in its original form provided for that kind of action,
Before work on the President's resolution is concluded by the
Congress, I hope that we will have acted to make clear the following points:

l,

That this country will not stand idly by if there

1s comrr.unist aggression in that area, and that such aggression
if it comes, will be met within our Constitutional processes.

\

2.

That this country will sustain with such material

aid as may be needed the e££o:rts of the United Nations Emergency
Force to maintain the truce in the Middle East.
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That any new aid programs -- military or economic

in the Middle East are only stop-gap unless they are related
in some manner to easing the economic and political difficulties
that have been caused by the Suez dispute, the Arab -Israeli conflict
and the other basic problems of the area.
4.

That this country will redouble its efforts

through the United Nations to curb a principal cause of the
intensification of the crisis in the Middle East -- Soviet and
other arms traffic.

~'**

No less critical than developments in the Middle East is the situation.
in Easte rn Europe.
aC.rr, iration.

The display of courage in Hungary has evoked universal

The growing pressure for freedom in Poland and elsewhere, and

even in Russia, has astonished those who with little comprehension of the power
of .liberty believed that only military force applied from without could shake the
g rip of tyranny within the Soviet enclave.
It is all very well, Mr. President, to stand on the sidelines and

exp ress admiration for the Hungarians and astonishment at the surging forces of
f r eedom in Eastern Europe.

It is all very well, Mr. President, to concentrate

our attention on the relief of refu gees from the terror in Hungary or to present
boldly - worded resolutions of conden1nation in the General Assen,bly of the
United Nations ,

>!'~'*
I am introducing at this time a joint resolution which I hope will help to
c larify these four points. I ask unanimous consent that this Resolution be refe rred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee for such
use as it Inay have in connection with consideration of the President 1 s proposal on
the Middle East.
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But there are also other implications which emerge fron the
stirrings in the Soviet empire.

There are new challenges which confront us and

I trust the Administration will lose no time in meeting them.

Our 1ntere st with

respect to Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union itself is not merely in the
tearing down of tyranny.

It is not in the spread of chaos and destruction from

which new tyranries may well emerge, well-fed on the blood of rr.artyrs to
freedom,
Our interest with respect to Eastern Europe, our fundamental
interest, is in the building up of stable, responsible and humane governments
peaceful governments -- which can take their rightful place in a peaceful Europe
and in a world at peace,

This task of building lies preponderantly with the

peoples of Eastern Europe and each will bring to it those unique characteristics
which are the marks of nationhood,
What we and others do or fail to do in our policies, however, will
have an impact on the process.

Our policies will hasten or delay the building.

That is why I urge the Administration to go beyond the immediate repercussions
of the crisis in Eastern Europe.

It is time to recognize that we are dealing not

only with the monolithic structure of international communism in that region.
are also dealing with a many-sided

vv-'

situation~hich

We

old, new and frequently

obscure political forces are at work.
It is time to note and to note carefully that political developments in

Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland are following different patterns and that those
which are likely to take place in Bulgaria, Rumania and elsewhere may be equally
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dissimilar,

It is time to find out why,

It is time to develop policies which

recognize these differences, policies which in each case offer the best hope of
the erne rgence of stable, responsible, humane and peaceful governments.

A

single policy, a single attitude towards the entire region of Eastern Europe, in
my opinion, no longer serves the interests of the United States.
It is time, too, to consult intensively and to cooperate closely with

the nations of Western Europe on this matter.

Those nations have lived for a

long tirne in more intimate contact with the troubled regions to the east.

Tyranny

is an old story in that part of the world and the West Europeans are not
unfamiliar with it,

Their views on this question, as expressed in NATO and

elsewhere, warrant our most careful attention.
The concern of the European democracies in the satellite countries
of Eastern Europe is rr.ore direct and it is deeper than ours.
for many reasons.

That is the case

The most significant, however, is that developments in

Eastern Europe are closely linked with the central problem of Western Europe
--the unification of Germany.

The time may be rapidly approaching when there

will arise the greatest challenge since the end of World War II not only to our
foreign policy but to the policies of the nations of Western Europe.

That

challenge will be to relate the solution of the problerr1 of German unification to
the unfolding developments in Eastern Europe in a manner which insures the
independence and the tranquillity of all the nations of that tormented continent.
When that moment comes, I hope the Administration will be prepared for it and
will have the courage to face it.

It may be the last chance in this century to

insure a lasting peace and the survival of recognizable human civilization on
earth.
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In anticipation of that moment, this nation rr,ust redouble its efforts
to encourage a deepening unity in Wes tern Europe.

Further, this nation must

maintain and strengthen its ties with that region in the interests of common
security and common progress.
I do not accept the bland assurances of this Administration that all
is right with these ties.

The handling of the Middle East crisis has set in

motion new impulses of division,

These come on top of others which have

plagued our relations with Western Europe in recent times.

They hasten the

process of erosion of unity which has gone on for several years.
It is true that a common revulsion against the Soviet atrocities in

Hungary has brought the nations of the Western world once again more closely
together.

To equate this momentary seeking of sanctuary on common ground

with genuine unity, however, to assume that it is evidence that all is right with
that unity, borders on the irresponsible,
I have said it many times and I repeat it now: the unity of the
We stern nations, welded in the agony of two wars, supported at enormous cost
by the people of the United States, is in grave danger.

If it is to hold, it must

be sustained by something more than a common revulsion, by something more
than a common fear of Soviet brutality.

Unless this unity rests on a mutual

appreciation of its vital necessity to each, unless there is a will to cooperation
in the solution of common problerns and the national forebearance which makes
cooperation possible, unless there is inspired leadership towards new goals of
corrimon progress --unless these positive elements are present, the process of
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disintegration will go on,

In time, if anything at all, only the look of unity will

remain in such institutions as the European Union and NATO.

These institutions,

however, will be devoid of substance,
If there are grave dangers underlying the situation in Western Europe,

others are buried in the situation on the other side of the globe, in the Far East.
A calm appears to have settled over that region and a silence amounting
virtually to censorship has characterized the Administration's handling of
developments in tr.at reg:!.on,
composed?

We may well ask ourselves, of what is the calm

What is the s;.Jnificc:..ncc of the silence?
The call:::., }.tlr . Prec;idcnt, is cornposed of three tenuous truces--

the truce in Korea, the trace in Forrnosa a.nd the truce in Indochina.

These are

truces which act to rr..aintain an uns!:ab:e status quo in the Far East but they
settle n ,)thing.

It is this status quo, this calm, this outwc::.rd calm, this

questionable calrr. that has been presented to the people of the United States as
an achievement of peace.
How lor-. g will the

cc:.~m

in Indochina, soon put a,1 end to it?

last?

Will the urge to unification in Korea,

What of the continuing threat to F orm.osa?

What is like:!.y to err:erge f rorr. be vast and cr.urning maw of the corr.munist
mainland?

What hc.s beer. achieved in the conversations between the Chinese

communist delegate c:..nd the Pre sident 1 s representative which have gone on for
years in Geneva?

What will follow the res tored relations --trade and other --

between Japan and the communist mainland?

Have these been counterbalanced

by tightening ties between Japan and other free nations?
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We do not even begin, Mr. President, to have adequate ins1ght into
these and other irr.portant questions concerning the F ar East.

Yet, in that

region no less than elsewhere and in s orne ways more, the forces of chan ge are
constantly at work.

We shall be in a position neither to understand them nor to

deal with them if the people of this country are lulled into a false sense of
security about the Far East.
curtain of silence,

The need is neither for a seeming calrr, nor a

The need, in the first instance, is for facts, facts w hich the

Administration alone can supply,

It is a need for action based on those facts,

action designed to strengthen security and peace as they may be threatened in the
Far East, not only for the moment but for years to come.
In Latin America, from which I have recently returned, our relations
are still, on the whole, friendly,

The Fulbright and other exchange-of-persons

programs, technical cooperation, Export-Import Bank loans and other measures
have made a great contribution to the building of these relations with the
neighboring American Republics.

Over the years of the Good Neighbor Policy, a

substantial reserve of goodwill was established in the nations to the south.
The reserve, however, is not inexhaustible and in recent years we
have used up much of it.

Our relations are suffering from neglect and ineptitude

in their administration,

There is a pressing need for creative leadership in this

field, a leadership which will search out in the Organization of the American
States and in other ways methods of revitalizing the meaning of Pan-Arr.ericanisrr,_
What is needed is a broad advance to new ground in the cooperation of the Weste rn
hemisphere so that this cooperation will yield greater progress and g reate r
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satisfactions to all the peoples of the Americas.

I thought that when this

Administration several years ago substituted the term "Good Partner" for "Good
Neighbor" we would have that kind of an advance,

It has not been forthcoming.

We have not formed the partnership and we are in danger of alienating the good
neighbors,
Elsewhere in the world, in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa,
there has been some improvement in the understanding of the Executive Branch
both in regard to the realities of these situations and as to the measures of
policy for meeting them.

I may say that in the case of Indochina, this

irr.provement came only after half the country had fallen to communism and just
in time to avoid a disastrous involvement of American armed forces.

I have not

been in the region of Indochina since 1955, but available reports indicate a
remarkable diminution of the communist threat there, notably in VietNam.
Continuing improvement in our relations with Southeast Asia and
these other so-called underdeveloped areas, however, cannot be taken for
granted,

These relations require constant and sensitive cultivation if they are

to grow to mutual advantage,

A key factor in these relations are the aid

prograrr, s which are now under study by a Committee of the Senate,

Fron.

personal knowledge of the operation of these programs in Asia, I know that they
are in great need of adjustment if they are to help rather than hinder our
relations in that part of the world.
Mr. President, in this resume'! have touched only on sorr..e of the
n , ost salient circumstances which confront us in the world,

I believe I have said
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enough, however, to make clear that in broad perspective the international
situation remains essentially as I described it sorr,e months ago.

It is neither

black nor white, but, here, at the beginning of the year 1957, it is rr.any shades
of gray.
The actions of each nation and the interactions of all contribute to
this total pattern,

And beyond these factors are vast forces --physical,

economic, religious and others -- which move the long flow of human history.
They push the pendulum of mankind, in its broadest arc, towards universal
progress or universal destruction.
The influence which this country or any single country can exert on
these transcendental forces is limited,

Let us recognize that fact and, in

recognizing it, avoid the conceited and dangerous delusion of omnipotent world
power.
Because that is the case, let us not conclude that we can or should do
nothing.

Recognition of the limits of our world influence is not a call to retreat

into the non-existent insulation of isolation.

It is not a license to ignore the

international responsibilities which this generation of Americans must assume
if future generations are not to be plagued by our irresponsibility.
Recognition of the lirr,its of our influence, in short, is the first step
m the responsible use of that influence.

It is a call to wield that influence, as it

1s expressed in foreign policy, with care, with restraint and with econorr1y.
I do not believe, Mr. President, that we are using the influence of the
United States in that fashion when we perrrdt dangerous and largely unnecessary
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divisions to disrupt our relations with Western Europe ,

We are not using our

influence wisely when we pursue in the Middle East what app ears to be, not a
policy of isolation, not a policy of internationalism, but a policy of isolated
internationalisn.. .
We are not using it wisely when expensive aid prograrr.. s begin to
work at cross-p urp oses, as in India and Pakistan.

We are not using it wisely

when these aid progr?...ms t end to produce dependency rather than independence in
other countries, wh e r. t hey becorr1e the n 1eans for irresponsible governn;ents to
p rolong their i rr e s :Jor..e ihility t c their peoples,
We a!' e n ot-

us~7l.i.5 i ~

v: i s ely when the rr.. ultiple a g encies of the

Executive Branch p ul: in di! fer e nt directions in foreign relations ,
We are not using it w isely when public relations is substituted for
policymaking ,
W e are not usir..g it wisely if drift, dod g e and delay replace decision,
We are not us i ng it wisely when old policies are persisted in after
they have outlived H e ir

u~efulness,

These are s orr.. e of the ills of our forei g n policy as I see them, Mr.
President,

They suggest their own r e medies.

There is a need to restore and to

strengthen close working relationships with independent democratic countries
abroad, on the basis of mutuality of interest and mutuality of sacrifice,

There

is a need to complete the various studies of foreign aid now in prog ress as
rapidly as possible and, if I may emphasize the point, to apply the findings of
these studies in legislative and administrative action ,
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There is a desperate need to strearr,line and coordinate the ope r a t ions
of the numerous departments and agencies eng aged in for e i gn acti viti e s,

The

step is essential not only to provide for a more economical use of available
resources but even more important to reduce the damage w hich the b ureaucratic conflicts and idiosyncrasies inflict on our relations with other nations.
There is a need throughout the Executive Branch to talk less and to do mor e .
There is a need to return not only the formulation of forei g n policy
but its conduct to where it belongs -- to the President and his Secretary of State .
There is a need finally to encourage the flow of new blood and new ideas -- som e
of which I trust will be Democratic -- into foreign policy.
And beyond all else, there is a need for clear, continuous and
constructive leadership from the President ofthe United States --leadership
which will point the way towards peace in a world where there is no peace.

Few

men, Mr. President, in our history as a nation have ever been in a better
position to provide that kind of leadership than Mr. Eisenhower.

He begins his

second term with a great personal mandate from the people of the United State s .
He has the confidence of the peoples of many nations, not excluding those in
Eastern Europe.

He is a Republican but his reputation and much of his

achievement were registered under Democratic adrr1inistrations.

Not eli g ib l e

for reelection, he can raise the office of the Presidency beyond politics.

He has,

in short, an unparalleled opportunity to perform a g reat and lastin g ser v i c e to
this nation and to the entire world.

Let him lead from the generalities of pe a ce

which characterized his first administration and his recent inaugural address
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to the realities of peace in this, his second administration.

If he does so lead,

he will not lack for responsible cooperation from the Derr.ocratic majority in
Congress.

*************

*******

